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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
tribundl for the settlement of various in-
teresting questions between parties not
legally interested under our present con-
stitutions, such questions must be relegated
to lycenims and debating schools; for if
once the principle of the statute in ques-
tion is conceded to be correct, there is no
limit whatever to the number and kind
of questions that may be propounded to
our courts for discussion, and our courts
might easily become moot courts to which
all sorts of questions as well as contro-
versies might be brought.
The end sought by the statute is, how-
ever, a meritorious one, which might be
accomplished by some such system of ac-
knowledgment and record as is applicable
to deeds of conveyance. It would be
easy to prepare such an act, and it is to
be hoped that although the present statute
cannot be enforced, it has subserved a
useful purpose in drawing attention to a
subject than which there are few more
important.
MA tsHALL D. EWELL.
Chicago.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF IATNE.
1
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND.
2
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO.
3
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.'
ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
By Harried Woman-Sufficiency of.-Under a statute which provided
that in every case of a deed executed by husband and wife to convey
the wife's realty, " the wife acknowledging such deed or instrument shall
be examined privily and apart from her husband, and shall declare to
the officer taking such acknowledgment that the deed or instrument
shown and explained to her by such magistrate is her voluntary act, and
that she doth not wish to retract the same," an acknowledgment was cer-
tified. to as follows by the magistrate who took it: "Personally appeared
S. A. J. and A. J., wife of said S. A. J., to the within and foregoing
written instrument and severally acknowledged the same to be their free
and voluntary act and deed, hand and seal, the said A. J. having ac-
knowledged separate and apart from the said husband as the law directs,
and that they did not wish to retract the same :" Held, that the acknowl-
edgment was fatally defective : Reld, further, that the statutory provision
requiring the deed to be "shown and explained" to the married woman
was mandatory, and that the omission from the magistrate's certificate
of a statement that the deed had been " shown and explained" to the
married woman was fatal : Paine v. Baker, 15 R. I
BILLS OF LADING.
Cotton Shipped by Mistake to wrong Person-Bona' de Purchaser.
-Z. & Sons, and S., L., K. & Co., of Baltimore, employed the firm of
I From J. W. Spaulding, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 77 Me. Rep.
2 'From J. Shaaff Stockett, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 63 Md. Rep.
3 From George B. Okey, Esq., Reporter ; to appear in 43 Ohio St. Rep.
4 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 15 R. I. Rep.
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G. Bros , as a coinmon agent for the sale of fertilizers in the state of
Geogia. The fertilizers were sold on credit, and payment was secured
1y cotton notes of' the purchasers, payable to G. Bros., agent for Z. &
Sons, (Jr agent for S., L., K. & Co., as the case might be. The cotton
notes were f'or a certain sum of money, with the privilege to the makers
of redeeming them at maturity in cotton of a specified quality, and at
an agreed price. When sales were made, G. Bros., forwarded the pur-
chasers' notes to their principals in Baltimore, and when the notes
matured, they were returned to G. Bros., for collection. Some thirty-
two bales of cotton received.in payment of the fertilizers of Z. & Sons,
were shipped through the mistake of G. Bros., to S., L., K. & Co., and
the bills of lading were also delivered to them; they sold the cotton and
applied the proceeds to the payment of an indebtedness of G. Bros. to
them. Subsequently -. Bros., discovering their mistake, sent to Z. &
Sons an order on S., L., K. & Co. for the cotton. Demand having been
made, and delivery refused, Z. & Sons sued S., L., K. & Co. in trover for
the conversion of the cotton. The defendants claimed that they were
bona fide holders of the bills of lading for value, and that they thereby
acquired under the Act of 1876, ch. 262, a perfect title to the cotton,
not only as against G. Bros., but also as against the plaintiffs, the actual
owners : Iheld, that the plaintiffs not only had a right of property in the
cotton, but a right to its immediate possession, and were entitled to bring
their action of trover to recover damages for its conversion : Seal v.
Zell, 63 Md.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Mlunic pal Assessment-New Culvert -Under an ordinance for that
purpose, the city or Cleveland improved Kinsman street, between cer-
tain points. hy grading, draining and paving the same. This improve-
ment included the construction of a culvert for drainage, and the cost
of the improvement, which included the cost of the culvert, was assessed
upon the lots bounding and abutting thereon. After it was completed,
and the assessment was made. the culvert broke down and became use-
less for the use intended. The city then by another ordinance provided
for the con-truction of a new culvert at another point on the street, in
place of the old one, the cost of which to be assessed upon property
bounding and abutting on Kinsman street, within the termini of the
original imlprovement, and which had been assessed therefor, but not
bounding or abutting upon the culvert: ieldl, that this additional as-
sessment for the cost of the new culvert was not authorized by law.
Spangler v. Cleveland. 35 Ohio St. 469, approved and followed: Wat-
terson v. Brallel/, 43 Ohio St.
QRIMINAL LAW.
Juror-Questions to.-At the trial of one indicted for keeping a li-
quor nuisance the presiding justice commits no error in refusing to allow
a juror to te asked on his voire dire whether he has contributed money
for the prosecution of persons generally who are charged with keeping
such nuisances: State v. Hoxsie, 15 R. 1.
DAIMAG.S.
Trespass for unauthorized use of Land by Railroad.-An action of
trespass was brought against a railroad for running cars over ground, the
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title to which, owing to a failure to comply with certain statutory requi-
sites, never vested in the railroad : Reld, that plaintiff should be con-
fined to the damages caused by the acts of the defendant in running the
cars over the ground, and that plaintiffs were not entitled to recover in
this action either compensation for the use of the tracks or the value of




'tle-Possession- Undivided Interest.-Where land is forfeited to
the state for the non-payment of taxes assessed upon it, and the state
fails to convey the title to a purchaser for the reason of illegality in its
proceedings of sale, the original owner has a better claim of title to the
land than the purchaser has, and he may maintain an action against the
purchaser therefor: Chandler v. Wilson, 77 Me.
A person having for over twenty years a recorded deed of a township
of mainly wild land, during the time lumbering on some portions of it
and cultivating other portions, does not thereby divest the true owner
of his title of certain lots within the township, such lots not having
been occupied during that period of time: Id.
A person who obtains the title of three of the five heirs of an owner
of land, deceased, can recover only three undivided fifths of the land of
a person in possession, although the latter person does not occupy under
the other heirs ; the demandant has no seisin of more than three-fifths
of the land: Id.
EQUITY.
Reformation-Character of Proof required-Lapse of TiRme.-Where
a person seeks to reform an instrument upon the ground of mistake, he
must not only show clearly and beyond doubt that there has been a mis-
take, but he must also be able to show with equal clearness and cer-
tainty the exact and precise form and import that the instrument ought
to be made to assume, in order that it may express and effectuate what
was really intended by the parties. And the alleged intention of the
parties to which it is sought to make the instrument conform, must be
shown to have continued in their minds concurrently down to the time
of the execution of the instrument: Keedy v. _Yay, 63 Md.
The application for relief on the ground of mistake should be made
with due diligence, and time runs from the discovery of the mistake:
Ird.
An agreement in writing between S. and N. was made in the year 1862.
S. died in the year 1883, and one of the witnesses to the agreement also
died. In the year 1884, N. filed a bill against the executor of S., to
have the agreement reformed on the ground of mistake. It was not pre-
tended that N. was ignorant of what was written in the agreement, or
that he could not have been informed of it by the use of due diligence.
The agreement was at all times accessible to him, and he procured its
production for the examination of his counsel in respect to a litigation
between himself and the son of S. sometime before the death of either
S. or the deceased subscribing witness: Held. that the complainants'
application was barred by the great lapse of time from the date of the
agreement to the time of filing the bill: Id.
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EVIDENCE. See Neg[gence.
.Erpert- Wto is such-Insanity.-Whether a physician, called in a
case, is qualified to testify as an expert upon questions of insanity, is a
question of fact for the presiding judge to decide, and his decision is
usually final. In extreme cases where a serious mistake has been coin-
nitted, through some accident, inadvertence or misconception, his action
may be reviewed : Fayette v. CGesterville, 77 Me.
Skilful and reputable physicians, although not experts upon the sub-
ject, may testify to the mental condition of their patients when they
have adequate opportunity of observing and judging of their mental
qualities. But this does not embrace a case where a single examination




Right to Propertl-yFraudulent Conveyance by Testator.-An admin-
istrator cannot in Rhode Island maintain proceedings to recover property
conveyed away by the deceased, though the conveyances may have been
in fraud of creditors and the property may be needed to pay the debts
of the estate of the deceased : Estes v. Howland, 15 R. I.
In such case the defrauded creditors are the proper parties to act:
Id.
An administrator is, however, the proper party to act, in order to
recover sufficient property to defray the expenses of administration if
the assets in his hands are not sufficient for this purpose: 11.
When a bill in equity was brought by an administrator to set aside
as fraudulent against creditors conveyances made by the deceased, and
it did not appear whether the administrator held sufficient assets to pay
the expenses of administration: .Held, that the bill instead of being dis-
missed might, if the administrator lacked funds to defray the expenses
of administration, be amended by setting forth this fact and by adding
the creditors or some of them suing for themselves and the others: Id.
EXPERT. See Evidence.
FORMER RECOVERY.
Judgment in Tort-Previous Julgment in Assumpsit.-A. recovered
judgment in assumpsit against B. fbr money loaned. A. 'afterwards
brought case against B. for alleged fraudulent and false statements made
to obtain thd loan. B. pleaded in bar the judgment against him in
assumpsit : Held, that the plea was not good : Held, further, that the
value of the judgment in assumpsit was to be considered as pro tanto
reducing the damages recoverable in the action on the case : Whittier v.
Collins, 15 R. I.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See Specific Performance.
Parol Contractsfor Sale of Giowing Timber.-Parol or simple con-
tracts for the sale of growing timber to be cut and severed from the
land by the vendee do not convey any interest in lands, and are not
therefore within the Statute of Frauds : Banton v. Shorey, 77 Me.
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HIGHWAY. See Negligence.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Acknowledgment; Limitations, Statute of.
INJUNCTION. See Way.
INSANITY. See Evidence.
INSOLVENCY. See Lis Fendens.
INSURANCE.
Settlement on Wife and Children-Revocation of.-F. took out a life
insurance policy payable to M. and the children of F. When the policy
was taken out M. was his wife, and he had four children living by a
former wife. Subsequently a child was born to F. and M. Afterwards
F. and M. transferred their right, title and interest in the policy by an
unsealed instrument signed by them, as collateral security for a debt of
F., and the instrument and the policy were delivered to the creditor.
No question was made as to the validity of the transfer. On a bill
of interpleader brought by the insuring company after the deaths of F.
and M.: Held, that the policy was an executed, irrevocable, voluntary
settlement in favor of the wife and the children in being when it was
taken out: Held, further, that F. and M. could pledge or assign the
policy to the extent of their interests in it : Held, further, the policy
being for $5000, that one-fifth of this amount was due to the creditor
and one-fifth to each of the four children : Heldfurther, one of the four
children having died a minor before F., that the one-fifth due this child
should be paid to his legal representative, if any, and if none, to the
administrator of F., the child's father and next of kin : Conn. Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 15 R. I.
Separate Policies in different Companies-Several Liability-Election.
to Rebuild-Separate Compromise-11easure of Liability -A policy of
insurance on a building against loss or damage by fire, reserved to the
insurer the right to repair or rebuild upon giving notice of such inten-
tion within ninety days after proof of loss. After such proof the insurer
served notice of its intention to rebuild, " acting jointly with other
insurance companies claiming to be interested." At the time of the fire
and of this notice, there were ten separate policies, in as many different
companies, upon the same building; eight of which served like notices,
severally signed by the company serving them. Before the time expired
to rebuild, but while these insurers were taking steps for that purpose,
the plaintiff compromised and settled with all said companies so electing to
rebuild, except defendant, and released each of them fron all liability,
receiving for such release an amount of money in the aggregate much
less than the amount of these policies. The defendant's policy had this
condition : " In no case shall the claim be for a greater sum than the
actual damages to or cash value of the property at the time of the fire ;
nor shall the assured be entitled to recover of this company in a greater
proportion of the loss or damage than the amount hereby insured bears
to the whole sum insured on said property, whether such other insurance
be by specific, or by general, or floating policieR, and without reference
to the solvency or liability of other insurance." Held: 1. That the
liability of the defendant was several and not joint and that the seivice
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by defendant of its intention to rebuild, acting jointly with the other
companies, converted the respective policies from contracts for a money
indemnity into contracts of indemnity payable in repairing or rebuilding,
to be performed in the time named in the policy, but if no time is speci-
fied then within a reasonable time. 2. That the service of the notices
did not operate to change the terms of this policy. Hence the plain-
tiff may recover on this policy, such share of the whole damages as the
sum insured bears to the w hole amount insured without reference to the
solvency or liability of other insurance. 3. That after the policy has
been thus converted into a building contract, the insured might settle
and compromise with any of the companies thus bound to rebuild with-
out releasing the others from such proportionate share of such loss as
their policies bore to the aggregate insurance. 4. That in ascertaining
defendant's proportionate share of the entire loss reference must be had
to t he aggregate insurance without regard to the fact that some of the
companies had been settled with for a less sum than they were liable for,
or that others did not elect to rebuild, or were insolvent or not liable:
Good v. Buckeye Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 43 Ohio St.
JURY. See Trial.
LANDLORD AND TENANT. See Trespass.
LICENSE. See Way.
LIFE ESTATE.
Life Tena -Itcorne-Partnership Profits-Corpus of Estate.-A
testator devised the residue of his estate to his wife in trust for herself
for life, with remainder over. Just before his death he entered into a
co-partnership which was to continue for three years, and even in the
event of his death to be carried on until the end of that period. Held,
That the profits derived from the testator's share in the partnership
belonged to the life-tenant as income, and did not constitute a part of
the corpus of the testator's estate : Heighe v. Littig, 63 'Md.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Municipal Corporation.
Exception as to Married Women-How far affected by subseguent
Legislation enlarging their Powers.-The Act of April 3d 1861, consti-
tuting the real and personal property of a married woman her separate
estate, and the provisions of section 28 of the Civil Code (now Rev.
Stats., see. 4996), authorizing her to sue and be sued alone, did not
repeal by implication the saving clause in the Statute of Limitations secur-
ing to married women the right to maintain actions within the re-pective
times limited after such disability is removed: Ashley v. Rockwell, 43
Ohio St.
Lis PENDENS.
Insolvency Proceedings-Assgnment Pending.-While proceedings
were pending against A. and B. copartners, for the appointment of a
receiver of their property.under proceedings in insolvency, A. made an
assignment of his individual property to C. The receiver after his
appointment petitioned the court for an order upon A. and 0. requiring
them to join in a conveyance to him of the assigned realty and to trans-
fer to him the assigned personalty: Reld, that the assignment was sub-
VOL. XX=1I.-101
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ject to the doctrine of ls pendens, and that the petition of the receiver
should be granted: Petition of Frank S. Arnold, 15 R. I.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See Municipal Corporation.
MECHANIC'S LIEN.
Statutory Reguirements.-A mechanic's lien exists, and is operative by
virtue of statutory law only, and unless the substantial requirements of
the law are observed, the claimant is beyond the scope of the remedy.
While the courts are always prepared to construe the law liberally, and
as remedial in its nature, and to allow all proper and necessary amend-
ments to be made, yet all the proceedings must be in substantial accord
with the main requirements of the statute: Kenly v. Ssters of Charity,
63 Md.
MORTGAGE.
Failure to Record-Right of subsequent Purchaser-nterest of Mort-
gagor who Sells and Receives Purchase-Money Afortgage.-The mort-
gagor in an unrecorded mortgage, who sells and conveys the mortgaged
property, and concurrently takes back a mortgage from the purchaser to
secure the purchase-money, retains such an interest in the property as
may be taken in equity and applied on the debt secured by the unre-
corded mortgage : Rome Building and Loan Association v. Clark, 43
,Ohio St.
The purchaser from the mortgagor of lands encumbered by an unre-
corded mortgage, takes title thereto free from such encumbrance, even
if he has full knowledge and notice of its existence, and that it is unpaid
at the date of his purchase : Id.
-If a judgment creditor procures a judgment against such a purchaser
after such unrecorded mortgage has been recorded, his lien thereunder
is valid as against such mortgage, and upon a judicial sale of the mort-
gaged property the proceeds of sale will be applied to pay such judgment
lien, in preference to the mortgage which was not recorded at the date
of such purchase: Id.
Foreclosure by Senior .Mortgagee-Rights of Junior Mortgagee.-
Where a senior mortgagee forecloses his mortgage, and sells the pro-
.perty, without making a junior mortgagee a party, or giving him notice,
the purchaser, at such judicial sale, whether it be the senior mortgagee
or a stranger, acquires his title subject to the right of redemption by
the junior mortgagee, and the same rule applies where the junior mort-
gagee has assigned all his interest in the mortgage, and the notes
secured thereby to a third person, who is not a party and is without
motice of such proceedings and sale: Rolliger v. Bates, 43 Ohio St.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Constitutional Law; Negligence.
Injury to Bridge-Parties to Action for-Statute of Limitations.-
The board of commissioners of a county is the proper party to bring
an action to reimburse the county for expense incurred by such board in
rebuilding a bridge upon a county road within the limits of a village,
which bridge had been so far wrongfully injure4 by a railroad company
in the construction of -its railroad across such county road, as to require
the construction of a new bridge. Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 35
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Ohio St. 1, distinguished : Commissioners v. Newark, S. & 8. Rd. Co.,
43 Ohio St.
The Statute of Limitations does not begin to run against such cause
of action until the complete restoration of such bridge, by the commis-
sioners, to its former condition of usefulness and satty; and does not
interpose a bar to recovery within six years after such restoration: I .
Tort of Officrr-Discharge of Inferior Emplicce-Suit for Damages.
-The fibreinan of an engine company in the fire department of Balti-
more city, was dismissed by the fire commissioners from the service of
the department, for disrespect to his superiors. In an action brought by
him against the city, to recover the salary claimed to have become due
to him since the date of his dismissal, it was hebl : 1st. That the de-
fendant could not be held responsible for the determination of the fire
commissioners, but they alone must answer for the want of' good faith,
if any existed, in dismissing their appointee. 2d. That if there were
no arrears of salary at the time of dismissal, any wrong done by the
commissioners must be redressed by an action of damages against them,
and not the city. 3d. That their right of removal being absolute, the
discharged employee ceased to be an incumbent of the position, and
could no longer sustain a demand for salary as such, however its subse-
quent loss might enter as an element into the damages to be recovered
of the commissioners, for fraudulent or illegal conduct in his removal
Mayor, &c.,'of Baltimore v. O'.eill, 63 Md.
NEGLIGENCE.
Proof of- General Character for Carefulncss.-In an action for per-
sonal injuries received by a collision at a railroad crossing, evidence will
not be received to show the general character and habits of the traveller
for carefulness, as bearing upon the question of due care on his part,
though the injuries occasioned death before he could tell how the acci-
dent happened, and no one saw him at the time of the collision : Chase
v. Mfaine Cent. Rd. Co., 77 Me.
In such a case the natural instinct for self-preservation does not afford
proof of the absence of contributory negligence on the part of the trav-
eller. It may give character or force to facts already proved, but it does
not of itself add or create proof: R.
Town-Ilighway- Want of Repair- Contributory .leglgence.-A
town is not required to render a way passable for the entire width of the
whole located limits: ilforse v. Inhabitants of Belfast, 77 Me.
In determining the question whether a way is safe and convenient
within the meaning of the statute, it is enough that the way is safe and
convenient in view of such casualties as might reasonably be exrected
to happen to travellers : Id.
The law has not prescribed what imperfections in a way will be con-
sidered as constituting a defect or want of repair, so as to render a town
liable if an injury is occasioned thereby. These are questions of fact,
generally, for the jury to settle, under proper instructions : IR.
In an action for personal injuries received by reason of a defect in a
way the question, whether the plaintiff or driver was in the exercise of
ordinary care, is proper for the jury to consider and determine: Id.
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PENSION.
Exemptionfrom Execution.-By the statutes of the United States,
the money due a pensioner is exempted from attachment or seizure upon
legal process while it remains with the pension office or any officer or
agent thereof, or is in course of transmission from such officer or
agent to the pensioner, but not after the money has come to the pen-
sioner's hands; when the money is actually in the possession of the
pensioner the protection ceases: Friend v. Garcelon, 77 Me.
Pledge-Attachment.-One who loans money to a pension claimant to
enable him to establish his claim, and to be repaid when the pension money
is received, is not debarred from recovering back his loan by U. S. R.
S., sect. 5485 : Crane v. Inhab. of Zinneus, 77 Me.
A verbal promise by a pension claimant, to pay a debt, when he re-
ceives his pension, or out of his pension, is not such a pledge, mortgage,
assignment, transfer, or sale of the pension claim, as is forbidden by
U. S. R. S., sect. 4745 : .d.
When the pension check has come into the hands of the pensioner, it
is then at his free disposal, and its proceeds are liable to attachment,
unaffected by U. S. R. S., sect. 4747: Id.
RAILROAD. See Damages; Negligence; 'Way.
REFORMATION. See Equity.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
Parol Contract for Land.-A parol agreement for the conveyance
of land may be enforced in equity in behalf of the vendee whose partial
performance has been such that fraud would result to him unless the
vendor be compelled to perform on his part: Woodbury v. Gardner,
77 Me.
Thus, where the vendee, with the assent of the vendor, took open,
actual possession of the premises in pursuance of the agreement, made
permanent erections thereon, promptly paid the taxes assessed thereon
to him by direction of the vendor and substantially performed his agree-
ment, specific performance was decreed against the vendor's sole devisee:
Id.
TAXATION. See Constitutional Law.
TRESPASS.
Landlord and Tenant.-A landlord cannotmaintain trespass for injury
to the premises let, done by the tenant during the tenancy. His remedy
is trespass on the case: Carroll v. Rigney, 15 R. I.
TROVER. See Bilhs of Lading.
TRIAL.
Instruction to Jury-Personal .Knowledge.-An instruction which au-
thorizes a jury, in determining an issue presented to them, to infer what
was the fact from the evidence, " or from such personal knowledge as
you may have in relation to matters of this kind," is erroneous: Doug-
lass v. Trasko, 77 Me.
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WAY.
Railroad- Licezse-Revocationl-In jnzctionz.-A railway company
which has entered upon land under a license from the owner, and con-
structed its road, cannot plead such license as a defence to an action of
trespass quare clausum fregit, fbr running its trains over said land,
brought by the owner thereof: Baltimore & Hanover Rd. Co. v. Algire,
63 Md.
A right of way is such an interest in land as cannot be acquired by a
mere license. It can only be acquired in this state in the mode provided
by the statute, that is, by deed duly executed and recorded : Id.
Where a railway company has the right under its charter to acquire a
right of way over certain land by condemnation, and proceedings for
such purpose are dispensed with by reason of the consent of the owner
of the land to the construction of the road, and he subsequently, after
the road has been built at large expense, revokes his consent, a court of
equity will restrain him from interfering with the railway company in
the use and enjoyment of the right of way pending proceedings to have
the same condemned : Id.
Public Way-Dedication-se-Right of Owner of Soil.-The ex-
istence of a public way may be established by evidence of au uninter-
rupted user by the public for twenty years ; the presumption being that
such long-continued use and enjoyment by the public of such way had
a legal rather than an illegal origin : Thomas v. Ford, 63 Md.
At the common law, however, the principle of presumptive dedica-
tion, or quasi prescription, does not apply to give rise to a right in the
general public to use the land of an individual on a navigable river, as
a public landing, and place of deposit of wood and other articles of
property for an indefinite time: 1d/.
The existence of an ordinary highway over the land of an owner,
whether it had its origin by condemnation, dedication or prescription,
does not divest him of the property in the soil. In such case he has
full dominion and control over the land, subject to the easement in the
public, and he may recover it in ejectment, or bring an action for tres-
pass against any person who deposits wood, stones or rubbish upon the
soil, or otherwise infringes upon the ordinary proprietory rights of the
owner of the soil, in a manner not in the use of the easement as a high-
way : Id.
WILL.
Attestation.-Under a statute requiring that a will shall be attested
and subscribed in the presence of the testator the witness must actually
sign in the testator's presence; acknowledgment in the presence of the
testator of the witness's signature affixed in the testator's absence, is a
nullity: Town of Pawtucket v. Ballou, 15 R. 1.
Detvise-L apse- Gift of Residue. -Residuary testamentary disposition
as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and re-
mainder of my estate, reil, personal and mixed, wherever and however
situate, of which I am now possessed, or may die seised or possessed,
unto my sons S., T., B., H., J. and C., to have and to hold the same
with all the privileges and appurtenances to the same belonging, to them
